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A Framework for Including Family Health
Spillovers in Economic Evaluation
Hareth Al-Janabi, PhD, Job van Exel, PhD, Werner Brouwer, PhD, Joanna Coast, PhD
Health care interventions may affect the health of pa-
tients’ family networks. It has been suggested that these
‘‘health spillovers’’ should be included in economic eval-
uation, but there is not a systematic method for doing
this. In this article, we develop a framework for including
health spillovers in economic evaluation. We focus on
extra-welfarist economic evaluations where the objective
is to maximize health benefits from a health care budget
(the ‘‘health care perspective’’). Our framework involves
adapting the conventional cost-effectiveness decision
rule to include 2 multiplier effects to internalize the
spillover effects. These multiplier effects express the ratio
of total health effects (for patients and their family net-
works) to patient health effects. One multiplier effect is
specified for health benefit generated from providing
a new intervention, one for health benefit displaced by
funding this intervention. We show that using multiplier
effects to internalize health spillovers could change the
optimal funding decisions and generate additional health
benefits to society. Key words: economic evaluation;
extra-welfarism; family; informal care; spillovers. (Med
Decis Making 2016;36:176–186)
Economic evaluation plays a growing role in theallocation of resources in the health care sector.1
It provides a way of maximizing a specific objective,
normally health benefits, from a health care budget.2–
5 Health maximization is achieved through evaluating
health care interventions in terms of their incremental
costs and incremental health benefits. Typically, health
benefits are only considered in relation to patients in
an economic evaluation. This neglects any wider
health benefits of interventions (‘‘health spillovers’’).
Health spillovers may occur for a variety of rea-
sons. Health care may benefit family carers, for exam-
ple, by relieving them of emotionally and physically
demanding caring responsibilities.6 Treating
a patient’s health problems may also reduce family
members’ anxiety7,8 and alleviate feelings of grief.9
Furthermore, patients are embedded in social net-
works, where individuals’ outcomes are codependent
on one another.10 As a result, changes in care for one
individual may have health-related consequences for
a wider social network around the patient.
Frameworks to account for spillovers in economic
evaluation have—to date—focused on the welfare
effects of health care. Culyer’s work in the 1970s and
1980s developed the concept of the caring external-
ity.11–13 In these articles, Culyer shows how public
intervention in health care may internalize a caring
externality and improve socialwelfare. Basu andMelt-
zer14 developed a family utility function to model the
wider welfare effects of health care interventions.
They show how the value of treatment increases
when the altruism between family members is taken
into account. In addition, a number of studies have
empirically estimated the welfare effects on parents
and partners from illness and intervention.15–18
Applied economic evaluation, however, frequently
takes an extra-welfarist position. Here the objective
is not to maximize utility but some other socially
relevant objective, normally health output.3,19
This requires the identification, measurement, and
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valuation of all health effects stemming from the inter-
vention.3 Authors have argued for the need to consider
health of carers4,20,21 and other individuals in the
patients’ network8,22 in economicevaluation.However,
recent reviews have found only a handful of applied
economic evaluations consider carers’ health in addi-
tion to patients’ health.23,24 By ignoring health effects
on carers andothers in the broader family network, eco-
nomic evaluations may misrepresent the health bene-
fits arising from health care interventions. However, it
is presently unclear as to how such health spillovers
can be included in a consistent and rigorous manner
in an economic evaluation.
In this article, we develop a conceptual framework
for including health spillovers in ‘‘extra-welfarist’’
economic evaluation, where the focus is onmaximiz-
ing health benefits from a fixed health care budget.
This corresponds with a commonly applied ‘‘health
care perspective’’ for economic evaluation,3 requested
by health technology assessment agencies in many
countries (e.g., theUnitedKingdom, Canada,NewZea-
land, and Brazil1). Specifically, we investigate 1) how
conventional practice in economic evaluation can be
modified to take health spillovers into account and 2)
when such spilloverswould ultimatelymatter in terms
of funding decisions and the resulting health benefits.
We apply this framework to account for family health
effects arising from interventions. The term family is
used loosely to describe the close network of individu-
als around the patient. The focus is on health effects
that arise from social and psychological mechanisms,
separate from infectious disease (pathogenic) transmis-
sion. Health effects generated through reduced disease
transmission would usually already be considered in
an economic evaluation as they accrue to potential
patients; such effects are not the focus of this study.
The article is conceptual innature but alsodrawson
data from a study of the long-term family impact of
meningitis to illustrate key issues. The second section
derives decision rules to explicitly account for health
spillovers in economic evaluation. The third and
fourth sections present data on health spillovers to
illustrate when health spillovers matter in health care
funding decisions. The fifth section discusses issues
in including health spillovers in economic evaluation.
MAXIMIZING HEALTH IN THE PRESENCE OF
SPILLOVERS: A THEORETICAL APPROACH
Conceptual Framework
In this article, we focus on economic evaluation
where the underlying objective is to maximize the
stream of health benefits from a given health care
budget. Economic evaluation in this form is typically
conductedwith the decision rule stated in expression
1. This states that the intervention is recommended
on efficiency grounds if the ratio of incremental costs
(Dc) to incremental health benefits (Dh) is less than
some threshold ratio (k), representing the opportu-
nity costs of diverting resources to the proposed inter-
vention.2 All notation is listed in Table 1. If the left-
hand side of expression 1 is less than the right-hand
side, then the provision of the intervention is judged
to be efficient, in the sense that it is likely to generate
more health benefits than it displaces.
Dc=Dh\k: ð1Þ
As highlighted earlier, it is common practice that
only health benefits to patients aremeasured and val-
ued in applied economic evaluation. We therefore
suggest that the way in which the decision rule is
operationalized in practice is represented in expres-
sion 2. Here incremental health benefits and the
threshold ratio have a subscript p because we assume
that both are estimated in terms of patient health gener-
ated and patient health forgone.We assume the oppor-
tunity cost of diverting resources is measured in terms
of patient health forgone, as this is the assumption
underlying the most comprehensive recent work to
estimate a cost-effectiveness threshold.25
Dc

Dhp\kp: ð2Þ
As argued earlier, health spillovers are likely to be
present in the health system. In order words, health
care interventions may result in health consequences
to patients’ family networks in addition to the
patients themselves. This means that in reality incre-
mental health benefits (Dh) are the sum of incremen-
tal health benefits to patients (Dhp) and patients’
family networks (Dhn). At this stage, we make no
assumption about the scale (or even direction) of
such health spillovers, only that they may be
nonzero.
Generating and Displacing Spillover Effects
Within a system with a fixed budget, funding
a new health care intervention implies displacing
health sector activity elsewhere. Just as it is possible
that a new intervention could generate health spill-
overs, so it follows that displacing activity elsewhere
in the health system may also displace health
spillovers. For example, withdrawing a beneficial
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intervention may result in additional anxiety to
patients’ family members.
To take account of health spillovers in a consistent
manner, both health spillovers generated and those
displaced need to be considered. This means both
sides of expression 2 need to be modified. On the
left-hand side, this can be done by explicitly account-
ing for the health spillovers generated by the inter-
vention in the denominator (i.e., representing Dh as
(Dhp + Dhn)). On the right-hand side, k represents
the ratio of displaced costs (Dcd) and displaced bene-
fits (Dhd), and so the right-hand side can be amended
by expanding the denominator to include displaced
health spillovers (see expression 3).
Dc

ðDhp1DhnÞ\ Dcdð Þ

Dhdp1Dhdn
 
: ð3Þ
Since kp = Dcd /Dhdp, kp can be substituted back into
expression 3 to express the decision rule in terms of
the information conventionally used in an economic
evaluation and the additional information needed to
represent the presence of health spillovers (see
expression 4).
Dc

ðDhp1DhnÞ\kp  hdp

Dhdp1Dhdn
 
: ð4Þ
Specifying Multipliers
The decision rule in expression 4 implies that
health spillovers generated (Dhn) and displaced
(Dhdn) by each decision would have to be directly
measured. In practice, measurement of all health
spillovers generated and displaced may not be prac-
tical, if only because it often remains implicit what
interventions get displaced. In such cases, health
spillovers might still be accounted for in the deci-
sion rule by specifying a ‘‘multiplier’’ (m) to repre-
sent the ratio of incremental total health benefits
(comprising health benefits to patients and their
family networks) to incremental patient health ben-
efits from the intervention. This multiplier requires
only the ratio of spillover benefits to patient benefit
to be known (rather than the absolute magnitude of
spillover benefits). This multiplier can be specified
for health benefits generated by a new intervention
(mi) and those displaced (md) (see expressions 5
and 6).
mi5 Dhp 1Dhn
 
Dhp: ð5Þ
md5 Dhdp 1Dhdn
 .
Dhdp: ð6Þ
Rearranging expression 4 and substituting the 2 mul-
tipliers generates expression 7. This specifies a deci-
sion rule for incorporating health spillovers in a way
that clearly relates to the conventional decision rule
(expression 2).
Dc
Dhp
 
 md
mi
 
\kp: ð7Þ
This means that a decision rule for economic evalua-
tion that incorporates health spillovers can be
expressed in terms of the conventional information
(incremental costs, incremental patient health bene-
fits, and a threshold ratio based on patient health dis-
placed) and 2multiplier effects. Onemultiplier effect
refers to health benefits generated by the health care
intervention (mi) and the other to health benefits dis-
placed by the health care intervention (md).
Table 1 Notation for the Terms Used in the Decision Rules for Economic Evaluation
Symbol Definition
Dc Incremental health care costs of the proposed intervention
Dh Incremental health benefits of the proposed health care intervention
Dhp Incremental health benefits to patients of the proposed health care intervention
Dhdp Incremental health displaced to patients of the proposed health care intervention
k Cost-effectiveness threshold (£ per unit of displaced health benefit)
kp Cost-effectiveness threshold (£ per unit of displaced health benefit to patients)
Dcd Incremental health care costs displaced by the proposed intervention
Dhn Incremental health benefits to patients’ network members of the proposed health care intervention
Dhdn Incremental health displaced to patients’ network members of the proposed health care intervention
m Multiplier effect on the stream of patient health benefits
mi Multiplier effect on the stream of patient health benefits generated by intervention
md Multiplier effect on the stream of patient health benefits displaced by intervention
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Implications for Maximizing Health Output in the
Presence of Spillovers
In this section, we graphically illustrate the effect
of different-sized spillovers on resource allocation
decisions. We consider a national decision to fund
a new health care intervention. In this situation, the
benefits of the intervention, in terms of patient
health, can be represented graphically by the mar-
ginal health benefits (MHBP) schedule in Figure 1.
As with a conventional demand curve for a normal
good, this schedule declineswith increasing quantity
to reflect the fact that some patients benefitmore from
the intervention than others.
The opportunity cost of funding the intervention,
in terms of foregone patient health benefits else-
where, is depicted by the marginal health losses
(MHLP) schedule. This is constant on the assumption
that the opportunity cost per unit does not vary with
each unit of the intervention (i.e., the intervention
cost is small compared with the health care budget
as a whole). Under these conditions, using informa-
tion on patient health benefits to maximize health
benefits results in funding the intervention up to
Q1. Here themarginal benefits (in terms of health gen-
erated) and costs (in terms of health displaced) are
equal.
Constant spillovers
The presence of health spillovers means that
the marginal health benefits generated by the
intervention to individuals in society as a whole
(MHBS) exceed the marginal health benefits to
patients. (In this example, we have assumed that
health spillovers are proportional to patient health
effects [within a given intervention]. Other formula-
tions of health spillovers are possible, but these do
not materially alter the conclusions of the analysis
in this section.)
Turning to the MHBS schedule, we can see this
intersects the MHLp schedule at Q2. This appears to
suggest that health benefits (which include patient
health benefits and health spillovers) would be max-
imized at a somewhat higher level of funding (Q2).
This point equatesmarginal health benefits to society
with marginal health displaced to patients (MHLp).
However, this fails to take into account the opportu-
nity costs, in terms of displaced health spillovers. If
the displaced health spillovers are of the same pro-
portion (relative to patient health) as those generated
by the new intervention, this results in an upward
shift in the MHLP schedule to MHLS (representing
the marginal health losses to society from displaced
health care spending). The MHBs and MHLs sched-
ules intersect at Q1 and the population health maxi-
mization equilibrium is reestablished at quantity
Q1. In this example, incorporating additional infor-
mation on health spillovers in decision making
results in the same equilibrium as when the focus is
only on patient health benefit. In other words, even
if health spillovers are present, if they are of a fixed
proportion relative to patient health benefits across
the new and displaced interventions, then decision
making based on patient health benefits is sufficient
to maximize net health benefits to the population.
This finding is also implied by expression 7 (see
‘‘Specifying Multipliers’’), which indicates that
when the ratio of health multipliers is 1, the conven-
tional decision rule will result in health-maximizing
decisions.
Relatively large and small spillovers
What if health spillovers are not constant across
new and displaced health care interventions? In Fig-
ure 2, health spillovers from the proposed interven-
tion are large relative to those displaced by the
intervention. The optimal position for generating
health output would be to increase the funding of
the intervention up to Q3 where MHBS and MHLS
are equal. This may in practice represent widening
access to an intervention, beyond the patient group
that derives the most benefit. Expanding funding to
Q3 would result in additional health benefits to
Quantity of proposed 
health intervention
Value 
(Health 
output)
MHLP
Q1 Q2
MHBP
MHBS
MHLS
Figure 1 Health benefits to society and health benefits to patients
are maximized at the same point (Q1) when spillovers are constant
across a new intervention and displaced health care. MHBP, mar-
ginal health benefits to patients; MHBS, marginal health benefits
to society; MHLP, marginal health losses to patients; MHLS, mar-
ginal health losses to society.
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society, represented by triangle A, relative to deci-
sions based on patient health benefits alone.
In Figure 3, health spillovers from the proposed
intervention are small relative to those displaced by
the intervention (albeit still positive). Taking into
account the marginal health benefit to society
(MHBS) and the marginal health losses to society
(MHLS) implies a lower level of funding to maximize
health output (Q4). In this case, a decision to scale
back the provision of the health care intervention
from Q1 to Q4 would result in additional health ben-
efits to the population equal to triangle B. This exam-
ple demonstrates a somewhat counterintuitive
finding that it could be optimal to scale back, or with-
draw, an intervention even if, in some cases, the inter-
vention generates positive health spillovers. In fact, if
triangle B is larger than the triangle bounded by the
vertical axis and the MHBS and MHLS schedules (tri-
angle C), it implies that net health benefits would be
higher if the proposed intervention was not funded
at all relative to being funded all the way up to Q1.
This is because the value of the health spillovers
that are generated is more than offset by the value
of health spillovers that are displaced. Taken
together, Figure 2 and Figure 3 illustrate the implica-
tion of expression 7, that if health spillovers (and
hence multipliers) are not constant across the health
system, then explicitly incorporating health spill-
overs in the decision-making process is necessary
to maximize health benefits.
ARE HEALTH SPILLOVERS LIKELY TO VARY
ACROSS INTERVENTION CONTEXTS?
As documented in ‘‘Maximizing Health in the
Presence of Spillovers,’’ health spillovers matter for
economic evaluation when they vary across health
care interventions. In this section, we illustrate the
potential for variation in spillovers by using data
from study of family impact ofmeningitis.Meningitis
is an acute illness, but it can result in awide variety of
disabling after-effects (conditions) after the initial
recovery. These conditions include behavioral prob-
lems, learning difficulties, hearing and sight loss,
seizures, and amputations. These conditions provide
some insight into the spillover effects on familymem-
bers’ health status and therefore whether the poten-
tial spillover benefits of treatment and prevention
may vary across conditions.
This section draws ondata gathered from an earlier
study to examine whether meningitis affected family
members’ lives.26 The earlier study indicated that
conditions associated with meningitis were, in gen-
eral, associated with reduced health status for both
survivors (henceforth ‘‘patients’’) and their family
(henceforth ‘‘carers’’). In the present investigation,
we analyzed the association between the presence
of individual conditions and 1) the health status of
patients and 2) the health status of carers. We then
analyzed whether the pattern of associations differed
between patients and carers. This suggests whether
multipliers are likely to be constant across treatments
Value 
(health 
output)
MHLP
A
Q1 Q3
MHBP
MHBS
MHLS
Quantity of proposed 
health intervention
Figure 2 When spillovers on a new intervention are ‘‘large,’’
health benefits to society are maximized at a higher quantity (Q3)
than when patient health alone is considered (Q1). Triangle A rep-
resents the additional health benefit to society from increasing the
quantity of the intervention from Q1 to Q3.
Value 
(Health 
output)
MHLP
B
Q1Q4
MHBP
MHBS
MHLS
Quantity of proposed 
health intervention
C
Figure 3 When spillovers on a new intervention are ‘‘small,’’
health benefits to society are maximized at a lower quantity (Q4)
than when patient health alone is considered (Q1). Triangle B rep-
resents the health benefit to society from reducing the quantity of
the intervention fromQ1 to Q4. Triangle C represents the net health
benefit to society generated at Q4.
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for the different disabling conditions arising from
meningitis.
To determine associations between individuals’
health status and the conditions associatedwithmen-
ingitis, we ran 2 simple ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression models: one for patients and one for their
carers. For both groups, health status was measured
using the EQ-5D-5L27 and scored using interim value
sets for the United Kingdom.28 In the regression mod-
els, we controlled for individuals’ age, sex, and the
time elapsed since the initial infection, as these factors
may confound the relationship between after-effects
and health status. The results of the regressionmodels
are presented in the online appendix.
In Figure 4, we have drawn on the regression
results to highlight the marginal impact of three com-
mon conditions on the current health status of
patients and their carers. The figure suggests that con-
ditions affect differentially the health status of
patients and their carers. For patients, amputations
have the biggest mean impact (–0.23), followed by
behavioral problems (–0.11) and then mild/moderate
learning disability (–0.04). However, for carers,
behavioral problems have a bigger negative impact
(–0.03) than amputations (–0.01).
Table 2 shows the mean annual health benefit (in
terms of EQ-5D-5L) for patients and carers that
would, in theory, result from treating or preventing
each condition. The implied multiplier effects of
treatment are listed next in the table. These are calcu-
lated based on the formula listed in expression 4 and
are intended to be illustrative only. We have calcu-
lated 2 possible multiplier effects representing sce-
narios where health spillovers extend to 1 or 2
carers per patient. We have assumed additivity in
the multiplier effect as the multiplier represents the
ratio of total health effects (calculated by adding
effects on patients and family members) to health
effects on patients. The findings in Table 2 show
that the multipliers differ across the 3 conditions.
The multiplier on treating behavioral problems is
relatively large, and the multiplier on treating ampu-
tations is relatively small. Furthermore, the multi-
pliers diverge from one another as more family
members (carers) are assumed to be affected by the
health spillovers. In reality, health spillovers will
be likely to tail off with increased social distance
from the patient,26 limiting this effect somewhat.
INTERNALIZING HEALTH SPILLOVERS
Using Family Health Spillovers to Inform Resource
Allocation: An Example
In this section, we extend the analysis to illustrate
the potential impact of health spillover information
on funding decisions and health benefits.We analyze
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Figure 4 Mean implied health losses (on EQ-5D-5L scale) from after-effects of meningitis incurred by patients and their carers.
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decisions relating to the provision of a set of 6
hypothetical interventions to treat the 3 conditions
(behavioral problems, learning difficulties, and
amputations) highlighted in the previous section.
For each condition, we specify a relatively more
cost-effective intervention (A) and a relatively less
cost-effective intervention (B). We assume that in
reality, eachhealth care intervention generates health
benefits for patients and 2 carers, although the scenar-
ios differ in terms of whether the decision maker is
aware of this spillover information.
The 6 interventions are packages of care costing £2
million each. The patient health benefits specified
are hypothetical but deliberately selected to generate
cost-effectiveness ratios that are reasonably near to
a threshold value. We assume that the opportunity
cost to patient health of providing these £2 million
packages of care is 100 units of health benefits (corre-
sponding with a threshold of £20,000 per unit of
health). We also assume an opportunity costs to
carers’ health of 16 units of health for every £2million
of spending. This spillover of 0.16 is illustrative but is
based on figures showing the potential health spill-
over of conditions in other contexts.8,29
To examine the impact of explicitly incorporating
health spillover information in the decision-making
process, we consider 3 decision-making scenarios.
In the first scenario, funding decisions are based on
maximizing net health benefits to patients only. In
the second scenario, decisions are based onmaximiz-
ing health benefits to patients and a single carer. In
the third scenario, decisions are based onmaximizing
health benefits to patients and 2 carers. Information
on the degree of health spillover is taken from the pre-
vious section.
Decision Making with Different Information on
Health Spillovers
In scenario 1, we assume that to free up £2 million
to fund an intervention, we displace 100 units of
health elsewhere in the health care sector. The opti-
mal response to maximize net health benefits in sce-
nario 1 is therefore to fund any of the £2 million
intervention packages that generate more than 100
units of health benefit. Applying this decision rule
in scenario 1 results in both interventions A and B
for amputations and intervention A for behavior
being funded (Table 3).
In scenario 2, the decision maker incorporates
information on health spillovers extending to a single
carer for each patient. In terms of the proposed inter-
ventions, the multipliers (considering only a single
carer) listed in Table 2 have therefore been applied
to the patient health benefits in scenario 1. To reflect
the displaced health spillovers to a single carer, we
Table 2 Health Losses from Selected After-Effects of Meningitis and the Implied Health Multiplier Effects
from Intervening to Treat/Prevent the After-Effects
Patient After-Effect
Mean Impact of After-Effect (on EQ-5D-5L) Multiplier (mi)
On Patient
Health Status
On Carer Health
Status
One Network
Member Affected
Two Network
Members Affected
Behavioral problems –0.109 –0.030 1.28 1.56
Mild or moderate learning disability –0.041 –0.023 1.56 2.12
Amputation(s) –0.226 –0.005 1.02 1.04
Table 3 Perceived Health Benefits and Funding Decisions under Different Information Scenarios
Scenario 1a Scenario 2b Scenario 3c
Treatment A Treatment B Treatment A Treatment B Treatment A Treatment B
Behavioral problems 120 80 154 102 187 125
Mild/moderate learning disability 80 70 125 109 170 148
Amputation(s) 120 110 122 112 125 114
Note: Interventions that would be recommended for funding on the basis of maximizing (perceived) health benefits are in bold.
a. Decisions are based on maximizing health benefits to patients only (i.e., adopt treatments generating .100 units of health benefit).
b. Decisions are based on maximizing health benefits to patients and to a single carer (i.e., adopt treatments generating .116 units of health benefit).
c. Decisions are based on maximizing health benefits to patients and 2 carers (i.e., adopt treatments generating .132 units of health benefit).
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have used a displacement multiplier of 1.16 (see
‘‘Using Family Health Spillovers to Inform Resource
Allocation: An Example’’). The new decision rule is
therefore to adopt interventions that generate more
than 116 units of health benefit. Under the new infor-
mation, the pattern of funding changes so that inter-
vention A for learning disability should now be
funded, and intervention B for amputations should
no longer be funded to maximize health benefits.
In scenario 3, we assume that the decision maker
has full information of the health benefits generated
by the intervention (i.e., to the patient and both
carers). This can be demonstrated by revising the
multipliers applied to health benefits generated and
displaced by funding decisions. To reflect the dis-
placed health spillovers to 2 carers, the multiplier
on displaced health benefits is now assumed to be
1.32. The new decision rule is therefore to adopt
interventions that generate more than 132 units of
health benefit. In scenario 3, we see that using all
information about the health spillovers leads to a fur-
ther intervention being funded (intervention B for
learning disability) and another intervention that is
no longer funded (intervention A for amputations).
This is a stylized example, but it does illustrate 3
important points. First, that in the presence of spill-
overs that vary across conditions, decisions based
on patient health benefits can be far from optimal.
In this example, decisions based on patient health
benefits alone secured less than one-third (30/109)
of the potential net health benefits that could be
secured from optimal decision making. (Net health
benefits using patient benefit alone = (187 – 132) +
(125 – 132) + (114 – 132) = 30. Net health benefits
using patient and spillover information = (187 –
132) + (170 – 132) + (148 – 132) = 109.) Second, it is
important to consider health spillovers displaced
by funding decisions as well as those generated.
Failing to reduce the cost-effectiveness threshold
in scenario 3 (i.e., assumingmd is equal to 1) would
have resulted in all interventions being adopted
(losing an additional 32 units of health relative to
the optimal position). Third, considering only a sin-
gle carer when health spillovers in reality extend
further (as in scenario 2) may only capture part of
the extra stream of health benefits possible from
using spillover information.
DISCUSSION
This article outlines a technique to incorporate
health spillover effects on family members in
economic evaluation. We suggest health spillovers
could be incorporated through the estimation of 2
multiplier effects: one relating to health benefits gen-
erated and one relating to health benefits displaced
by a new intervention. This represents a relatively
simple modification of the existing decision rule for
maximizing health output. Furthermore, by introduc-
ing amultiplier for health displaced, aswell as health
generated, this prevents bias toward adopting new
interventions at the cost of existing interventions in
health technology appraisal.
Health spillovers become more relevant for eco-
nomic evaluation when the 2 multipliers diverge
from one another. This may happen when a new
intervention is associated with particularly large
health spillovers; for example, a new health care
intervention may alleviate substantial strain on
patients’ carers and family members. However, it is
equally important to consider contexts where a new
intervention might generate negligible or even nega-
tive health spillover impacts. In these cases, infer-
ence based on health benefits to patients will result
in overprovision of the intervention. Negative health
spillovers may occur when health care interventions
result in harmful spillovers in the wider population,
as, for example, in the case of antibiotic resis-
tance.30,31 They may also occur when interventions
shift the burden of care onto families, potentially to
the benefit of patients but to the detriment of family
members’ health. There is also some evidence of pos-
itive spillovers of caring.32,33 Presumably, such spill-
overs would be lost if the intervention prevented the
illness andhence caring responsibilities. However, in
general, evidence suggests that illness results in neg-
ative health spillovers on family networks.6,34,35
Themultiplier effect will also be influenced by the
size of the network affected by the health care inter-
vention. Largemultipliersmay be present when there
is a wide group of people surrounding each individ-
ual patient, even if the health effects on individuals
are relatively small and these individuals are not pro-
viding informal care.
Our framework differs in several respects from
a previous theoretical approach to incorporating fam-
ily spillovers developed by Basu and Meltzer.14 In
our approach, we assume that a societal decision
maker, such as a government or agency, makes health
care funding decisions tomaximize health benefits to
the population they serve. In contrast, Basu andMelt-
zer take as their starting point an individual who
makes decisions about purchasing medical care
based on maximizing his or her own utility. Thus,
the frameworks differ in both the decision maker
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and the decision maker’s objective. Furthermore,
Basu and Meltzer explicitly model the probabilities
of individuals surviving and being married because
the decision maker is an individual as opposed to
an organization. Finally, in contrast to some empiri-
cal studies,15,35 we estimate spillovers using a health
statusmeasure scored using social values, rather than
estimating spillovers using directly elicited utilities.
This offers consistency with the way in which health
effects are typically valued for patients36 and avoids
conflating health and nonhealth arguments in the
maximand.
Our assertion that health spillovers and multiplier
effects are likely to vary by context is consistent with
the broader literature. Evidence indicates that some
health conditions have a disproportionately large
impact on the family.35 For example, mental health
conditions are often associated with adverse out-
comes for family members,34,37–39 childhood health
problems may place particular emotional strain on
parents,29,34,40 and end-of-life care can have impor-
tant ramifications for the health of family members.9
Furthermore, spillover effects are not necessarily
only a function of the illness. Contexts involving sub-
stantial informal care may result in greater multiplier
effects because of the dual effects of physically
demanding care and emotional worry for family
members.7,8
In this study, we focused on economic evaluation
where the objective is maximizing health output
from scarce health care resources. Other maximiza-
tion objectives for economic evaluation are possible
too,19 including maximizing subjective well-being,41
maximizing capability gains,42 and, more conven-
tionally in mainstream economics, maximizing the
consumption value of health care.2 In all these cases,
the explicit inclusion of spillovers effects, whether
health, well-being, or welfare, is relevant to properly
maximizing the objective function, provided one
takes account of spillovers in the opportunity costs
too.43 Indeed, where the objective is the maximiza-
tion of the consumption value of health care, a
number of authors have already highlighted the
importance of considering spillovers (or ‘‘caring
externalities’’) in determining the economically opti-
mal level of health care provision in society.11,14,17,30
Within the realm of health maximization, health
spillovers might be conceived as ‘‘health externali-
ties’’ as they represent socially relevant, third-party
impacts of resource allocation decisions that are not
internalized in the decision-making process.
This article focuses on the inclusion of ‘‘outcome’’
spillovers in economic evaluation, but a couple of
points are worth considering in relation to ‘‘cost’’
spillovers. First, there is some evidence to suggest
that illness may affect the health care use of the
patient’s family.44 This suggests that treating or pre-
venting illness may result in cost savings in treating
patients’ family networks. These spillovers ought to
be included, in theory, where a health care perspec-
tive is taken. Second, under a societal perspective,
additional cost spillovers are important to consider.
These comprise the productivity (and time) losses
associated with the illness for patients and their fam-
ily members, out-of-pocket costs, and any costs or
savings to other public and private agencies.3
In certain contexts, there may be ethical concerns
in accounting for health spillovers in resource alloca-
tion decisions. For example, the inclusion of health
spillovers may imply greater funding for services for
people with dependents at the expense of those with-
out.14 However, it is also important to note that the
exclusion of health spillovers implies these health
benefits have zero social value: a position that has
not been subjected to normative scrutiny. Going for-
ward, it may be helpful to distinguish between the
analysis inherent in maximizing an objective func-
tion (whether health or otherwise) and the political
process surrounding health care funding decisions.
In the former, it is important to explicitly account
for health spillovers to identify which interventions
do in fact maximize health output. To inform the
political process of making a health care funding
decision, such spillovers might be presented along-
side patient health benefits as well as in aggregated
form to enable decisionmakers with different norma-
tive stances to weight them differently.20,21
In practice, including health spillover information
routinely in economic evaluations is likely to be chal-
lenging. Determining multiplier effects in different
contexts is likely to require a combination of mea-
surement and modeling work. In the short-term,
datawill be needed on the impact of health care inter-
ventions on thehealth of patients’ familymembers. In
the longer term, it might be quite acceptable to model
multipliers in certain decision contexts without the
need to resort to primary data collection. However,
this requires more information about the size of
affected networks, how health spillovers vary across
disease contexts, and whether they persist over
time. Health technology assessment bodies could
potentially play their part by ensuring that, where rel-
evant, health spillovers are not seen as an ‘‘optional
extra’’ but an integral part of understanding the
impact of funding decisions on population health.
In some contexts, this is starting to be done; for
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example, in their 2013 guidance, the National Insti-
tute for Health and Care Excellence (in England and
Wales) states that economic evaluations should con-
sider ‘‘all direct health effects, whether for patients
or, when relevant, carers.’’45 However, it is important
to bear in mind that health spillovers can extend to
the wider family network beyond those who self-
identify as ‘‘carers.’’
In conclusion, to pursue a goal of healthmaximiza-
tion, economic evaluations need to incorporate
health spillovers in addition to patient health bene-
fits. We have proposed a framework for doing this
through the inclusion ofmultipliers applied to health
benefit gained and displaced by a new intervention.
This will add some extra complexity to economic
evaluation. However, inclusion of health spillovers
has the potential to not just improve the conduct of
economic evaluation but also to include the family
perspective in decision making and generate real
health benefits to the population.
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